

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 03633 01 OF 02 181849Z
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W
-----181858Z 116578 /43

R 181330Z MAR 77
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5252

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 MOSCOW 3633

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PFOR SHUM SALT UR US
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S CONVERSATION WITH ARBATOV ON SALT AND
HUMAN RIGHTS

1. BEGIN SUMMARY. I HAD AN HOUR AND A HALF WITH ARBATOV
MARCH 17 AND HE MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS OF INTEREST.
ON SALT, HE SAID DEFERRAL OF CRUISE MISSILES AND BACKFIRE
COULD NOT GET FAVORABLE RECEPTION UNLESS LINKED WITH
COMMITMENT NOT TO DEVELOP OR PRODUCE CRUISE MISSILES FOR
DURATION OF DEFERRAL PERIOD. ON HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUE, HE
SAID GREAT HARM HAS BEEN DONE TO U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS AND
CLAIMED WE WILL SEE THIS FACT WHEN SECRETARY VANCE VISITS
HERE LATER THIS MONTH. HE ALSO ARGUED THAT THE DISSIDENTS
ARE BEING INCITED BY THE WEST TO SAY AND DO THINGS WHICH
ARE ILLEGAL, AND THOSE WHO INCITE THEM WILL BE RESPONSIBLE
FOR THE CONSEQUENCES. HE ALSO EXPLAINED SOVIET RELUCTANCE
TO EXPEL SAKHAROV AS PARTLY MOTIVATED BY FACT THAT THIS
WOULD NOT GAIN REGIME ANYTHING AND PARTLY BY FACT THAT
SAKHAROV IS STILL PRIVY TO CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.
END SUMMARY.

2. ON MARCH 17 I HAD HOUR AND A HALF CONVERSATION WITH
IUSAC DIRECTOR GEORGIY ARBATOV, WHO WAS IN A RELAXED
AND NON-DOCTRINAIRE MOOD. WHILE HE GAVE NOTHING AWAY, HE
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 MOSCOW 03633 01 OF 02 181849Z

DID SET FORTH FRANK AND COGENT ARGUMENTS ON THE SOVIET
POSITIONS ON SALT, ARMS CONTROL, AND HUMAN RIGHTS.

3. SALT: I ASKED HIM IF HE WOULD COMMENT ON THE PRESIDENT'S
RECENT PRESS CONFERENCE STATEMENTS IN WHICH HE SUGGESTED
THE POSSIBILITY OF POSTPONING CRUISE MISSILE AND BACKFIRE
ISSUES TO SALT III. ARBATOV REPLIED THAT HE WAS INDEED

FAMILIAR WITH THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENTS AND THAT, WHILE HE COULD ONLY SPEAK PERSONALLY ON THE MATTER, HE WAS, OF COURSE, FAMILIAR WITH THE OFFICIAL POSITION OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT. HE THEN WENT ON TO SAY THAT THE REACTION IN THE USSR WOULD HAVE BEEN MORE FAVORABLE IF THE PRESIDENT HAD ALSO OFFERED TO IMPOSE A BAN ON U.S. PRODUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT OF CRUISE MISSILES, WHILE DEFERRING THE ISSUE TO LATER DISCUSSIONS. WITHOUT SUCH AN UNDERSTANDING, THE SOVIETS WOULD NOT LOOK FAVORABLY ON THE PROPOSAL.

4. I SUGGESTED THAT HIS REMARKS DID NOT TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE FACT THAT THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE A QUID FOR SUCH RESTRAINT BY THE U.S. ARBATOV REPLIED THAT THIS WAS NOT THE PROPER WAY TO LOOK AT THE MATTER. THE SAME ATTITUDE WAS TAKEN IN THE U.S. REGARDING MIRV'S AND AS A RESULT THE SOVIET UNION WENT AHEAD AND PRODUCED MIRV'ED VEHICLES. THE SAME IS HAPPENING WITH MARV'S AND, IF THE U.S. PURSUES ITS PRESENT COURSE, THE SAME WILL HAPPEN WITH CRUISE MISSILES. IT IS TO THE MUTUAL ADVANTAGE OF BOTH SIDES TO STOP PRODUCING CRUISE MISSILES NOW. OTHERWISE THE SOVIETS WILL EXPAND AND REFINE THEIR CAPABILITIES AND IN THE END WILL CATCH UP AND PERHAPS EVEN SURPASS THE U.S. FURTHERMORE, IN THE PROCESS, WE BOTH WILL HAVE SHOWN THE POSSIBILITY TO OTHER EXISTING AND POTENTIAL NUCLEAR POWERS THE ADVANTAGES OF THIS RELATIVELY INEXPENSIVE NEW DELIVERY VEHICLE WITH ITS IMPROVED ACCURACY AND REDUCED SIZE. THE CRUISE MISSILE COULD CERTAINLY BE USED BY OTHERS (HE DID NOT SPECIFY WHO THESE OTHERS MIGHT BE).

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 MOSCOW 03633 01 OF 02 181849Z

5. CTB: WE THEN TURNED TO THE OTHER ARMS CONTROL ISSUES WHICH HAD BEEN IN THE PRESS OF LATE AND SPECIFICALLY THE QUESTION OF A POSSIBLE CTB. ARBATOV BEGAN BY CITING THE KNOWN POSITION OF THE SOVIET UNION AS PUT FORWARD IN GENEVA. I TOLD HIM I WAS AWARE OF THAT POSITION, BUT THAT I WOULD LIKE TO IMPRESS ON HIM THAT IN THE U.S. THERE WAS A BASIC SUSPICION ABOUT SOVIET MOTIVES AND, THEREFORE, THE QUESTION OF VERIFICATION WAS MOST IMPORTANT IN ANY CTB AGREEMENT. THIS BEING THE CASE, I ASKED HOW THE SOVIETS NOW LOOKED AT ON-SITE VERIFICATION.

6. ARBATOV REPLIED THAT IN THE PAST THE SOVIETS OPPOSED ON-SITE INSPECTION BECAUSE THEY DID NOT WISH TO EXPOSE THEIR WEAKNESSES AND BECAUSE THERE WAS DEEP DISTRUST OF AMERICAN MOTIVES IN DEMANDING SUCH INSPECTIONS. SOVIETS ARE NO LONGER CONCERNED ABOUT REVEALING THEIR WEAKNESSES, HE SAID, BUT THERE ARE STILL MANY PEOPLE IN THE USSR WHO SUSPECT THAT U.S. INTEREST IN VERIFICATION IS NOT REALLY INTEREST IN VERIFICATION OF AN AGREEMENT BUT PART

OF A CONSUMING PASSION IN THE U.S. TO LEARN ABOUT EVERY-
THING GOING ON IN THE SOVIET UNION.

7. HUMAN RIGHTS: I THEN TURNED THE CONVERSATION TO THE
HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUE AND REMARKED THAT ARBATOV'S IUSAC
COLLEAGUE VALENTIN ZORIN ON TV MARCH 16 HAD SEEMED OPTIMISTIC
ABOUT THE PROSPECTS FOR U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS IN SPITE
OF WHAT HE TERMED THE "CAMPAIGN" OVER HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE
U.S. WITHOUT DISPUTING ZORIN'S OPTIMISM, ARBATOV BEGAN
HIS RESPONSE BY TELLING ME THAT I MUST REALIZE THAT WHAT
U.S. HAS DONE THUS FAR HAS DONE GREAT HARM TO SOVIET-
AMERICAN RELATIONS AND THAT "YOU WILL SEE THIS" WHEN
SECRETARY VANCE COMES TO MOSCOW. THERE IS A SUBSTANTIAL
BODY OF OPINION IN THE USSR (HE DID NOT SPECIFY AT WHAT
LEVEL) THAT IS SUSPICIOUS OF WHAT PRESIDENT CARTER REALLY
WANTS AND ABOUT WHAT NEW ADMINISTRATION INTENDS TO DO.
HE THEN SAID THAT HE WANTED TO EMPHASIZE A POINT THAT
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 MOSCOW 03633 01 OF 02 181849Z

HAD BEEN EDITED OUT OF HIS USNWR INTERVIEW BUT WHICH HE
MADE SURE STAYED IN HIS NEWSWEEK INTERVIEW. THE WEST
MUST RECOGNIZE, HE SAID, THAT THEY ARE INCITING DISSIDENTS
TO SAY AND DO THINGS WHICH ARE VIOLATIONS OF SOVIET LAW
AND, THEREFORE, SOME OF THESE DISSIDENTS WILL BE IN DEEP
TROUBLE WITH SOVIET AUTHORITIES. WHEN THIS HAPPENS,
ARBATOV ARGUED, THOSE IN THE WEST SPEAKING OUT WILL BE
RESPONSIBLE FOR WHAT BEFALLS THE SOVIET DISSIDENTS. IN
MAKING THIS POINT, ARBATOV SPOKE OF "HUMANITARIAN"
CONSIDERATIONS AND RECALLED THE "EVENTS OF 1956" (I.E.,
HUNGARY), IN EFFECT SAYING THAT IN THE PRESENT CASE ALSO
THE (DISSIDENTS') BLOOD WILL BE ON THE HANDS OF THE WEST.

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 03633 02 OF 02 181655Z
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W
-----181900Z 112991 /43

R 181330Z MAR 77
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5253

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 MOSCOW 3633

EXDIS

8. I POINTED OUT THAT ARBATOV MUST REALIZE THAT THERE IS NO ORGANIZED CAMPAGIN IN THE U.S. AIMED AT THE USSR, BUT RATHER HE SHOULD REALIZE THE DEPTH OF PRESIDENT CARTER'S PERSONAL COMMITMENT TO THE CAUSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS. HE PARRIED THIS WITH THE COMMENT THAT IN RETURN WE MUST REALIZE THAT THERE ARE PEOPLE HERE WHO CONSIDER THIS ATTITUDE CONTRARY TO DETENTE. HE THEN ARGUED THAT THE SOVIETS COULD DO THE SAME THING TO US BY GETTING IN CONTACT WITH THE WESTHERMEN. I REPLIED THAT BREZHNEV HAD MADE A BAD MOVE WHEN HE MET WITH GUS HALL DURING HIS 1973 VISIT TO THE U.S. ARBATOV PASSED THIS OFF AS NECESSARY STEP FOR THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE CPSU ("CAPTAIN OF OUR IDEOLOGY") AND ONE WHICH HAD THE ADDITIONAL BENEFIT OF STRENGTHENING BREZHNEV'S HAND WITH THE THEN OPPONENTS OF DETENTE WITHIN THE LEADERSHIP SINCE HALL WAS A SUPPORTER OF DETENTE. I TOLD HIM THAT IF BREZHNEV GOES TO U.S. AGAIN IT WOULD BE BEST NOT TO SEE HALL AGAIN SINCE THERE ARE MANY IN U.S., WHO DID NOT AND WOULD NOT REACT WELL TO SUCH A MEETING. I ADDED ALSO THAT SINCE WE WERE TALKING ABOUT PROPER CLIMATE, I WISHED TO POINT OUT THAT IF A SALT AGREEMENT IS REACHED IT WILL HAVE TO BE SOLD TO THE CONGRESS. IF THE SOVIET UNION IS TAKING ACTION AGAINST THE DISSIDENTS THIS WOULD MAKE THE JOB MORE DIFFICULT.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 MOSCOW 03633 02 OF 02 181655Z

9. SAKHAROV: DURING THE CONVERSATION ON HUMAN RIGHTS WE SPENT SOME TIME ON SAKHAROV AND SOVIET TREATMENT OF THIS PARTICULAR DISSIDENT. SPEAKING STRICTLY PERSONALLY, I ASKED WHY, IF THE LEADERSHIP WAS SO CONCERNED WITH A "HANDFUL" OF DISSIDENTS, SAKHAROV IN PARTICULAR, THEY DID NOT SIMPLY EXPEL THEM. ARBATOV RESPONDED THAT IN SKHAROV'S CASE HE WOULD NEVER LEAVE WITHOUT A GUARANTEE THAT HE COULD RETURN. HE WOULD BE JUST AS MUCH A PROBLEM FOR THE SOVIETS IN THE WEST AS HE IS HERE BECAUSE IN THE WEST HE WOULD BE A HERO. SINCE HE WOULD HAVE HIS GUARANTEE TO RETURN, THERE WOULD BE NO GAIN FOR THE REGIME IN EXPELLING HIM. ALSO, WHILE HE WAS MAKING HIS GREAT CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE SOVIET UNION, HE WAS PRIVY TO MUCH CLASSIFIED INFORMATION AND ALTHOUGH IT HAS BEEN OVER TEN YEARS SINCE HE LOST HIS CLEARANCE, HE, IN THE MEANTIME, MAINTAINED HIS CONTACTS WITH HIS OLD COLLEAGUES AND, HENCE, HIS INFORMATION IS MORE CURRENT THAN HIS LAST DIRECT CONTACT WITH SOVIET PROGRAMS.

10. I SAID THAT THIS EXPLAINED WHY SAKHAROV WAS NOT EXPELLED, BUT IT DID NOT EXPLAIN WHY HE WAS STILL ACCORDED SPECIAL PRIVILEGES. ARBATOV CLAIMED THIS WAS BECAUSE THERE ARE MANY TRADITIONALISTS WHO NOTE THAT A FULL MEMBER OF THE ACADEMY OF SCIENCES HAS NEVER BEEN EXPELLED FROM THE BODY. SHELEPOV, HE POINTED OUT, WAS A CORRESPONDING MEMBER WHEN HE WAS EXPELLED; (IT IS NOT CLEAR TO US EXACTLY WHAT ARBATOV IS REFERRING TO HERE) AND EVEN LYSENKO AND KAPITSA AT THE HEIGHT OF THEIR UNPOPULARITY -- AND THEY HAD MANY ENEMIES--WERE NOT SUBJECT TO MOVEMENTS TO EXPEL. THIS DOES NOT, OF COURSE, MEAN THAT THIS RELUCTANCE WILL CONTINUE, HE EMPHASIZED, SINCE SAKHAROV'S FELLOW SCIENTISTS MAY YET DECIDE THAT HE IS NO LONGER TO REMAIN IN THEIR GROUP.

11. AS THE MEETING WAS ENDING I REMARKED ON THE APPOINTMENT OF KATUSHEV AS DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS WHICH WAS ANNOUNCED IN THE MORNING PAPERS, AND ASKED IF CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 MOSCOW 03633 02 OF 02 181655Z

HE WOULD KEEP HIS POSITION AS CC SECRETARY WHILE SERVING IN THE NEW JOB. ARBATOV CLAIMED NOT TO KNOW, BUT CITING PRECEDENT SEEMED TO THINK HE MAY NOT, ALTHOUGH HE IS, ACCORDING TO ARBATOV, A VERY COMPETENT INDIVIDUAL. THE MOVE WAS MADE BECAUSE LESECHKO IS OLD AND SICK AND THE COMECON JOB IS A DEMANDING ONE WHICH IS BECOMING MORE IMPORTANT ALL THE TIME.

12. COMMENT: ARBATOV IS A CLEAVER CONVERSATIONALIST, ONE OF THE FEW GOOD ONES IN THIS COUNTRY. HE KNOWS HOW TO PEG HIS ARGUMENTS TO THIS INTERLOCUTOR. WITH HIS GOOD FEEL FOR THE PSYCHOLOGY OF WESTERNERS HE KNOWS HOW TO PLAY HIS ARGUMENTS FOR MAXIMUM IMPACT ON THE LISTENER. I NOTE, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT IN HIS CONVERSATION WITH FRG AMBASSADOR SALM ON MARCH 17 HE MADE MANY OF THE SAME POINTS THAT HE DID WITH ME ABOUT HUMAN RIGHTS, BUT WAS MORE DIRECTLY CRITICAL OF THE PRESIDENT CALLING HIM AN "INEXPERIENCED POLITICIAN" WHO WOULD SIMPLY HAVE TO LEARN, AND SUGGESTING THAT THE HUMAN RIGHTS "CAMPAIGN" WAS PART OF HIS LEARNING PROCESS.

13. I WOULD CONSIDER ARBATOV'S REMARKS REVEALING ONLY IN A FEW RESPECTS. HIS COMMENTS ON THE CRUISE MISSILE SUGGESTS, WHILE NOT GIVING AWAY ANYTHING, THAT THE SOVIETS MAY BE SOMEWHAT MORE FLEXIBLE THAN WE HAVE HEARD THUS FAR, CERTAINLY MORE THAN ARBATOV HAS INDICATED IN HIS RATHER HARD LINE PUBLIC STATEMENTS. ALSO, HE INDICATED THAT THE SECRETARY WILL NOT BE RECEIVING THE KIND OF RECEPTION THAT HE MIGHT HAVE EXPECTED HAD THERE BEEN NO HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUE RAISED THESE LAST FEW WEEKS. HE TOLD SALM

THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD ADOPT A BUSINESSLIKE ATTITUDE
TOWARDS THE SECRETARY WHEN HE CAME. FINALLY, HIS COMMENTS
ON THE DISSIDENTS, SAKHAROV IN PARTICULAR, SEEM TO ME
TO INDICATE THAT THE PROBLEM IS STILL WITHOUT A
SATISFACTORY SOLUTION WITHIN THE LEADERSHIP; THEY ARE
STILL STRUGGLING WITH IT, TRYING TO FIND A SOLUTION.
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 MOSCOW 03633 02 OF 02 181655Z

14. DEPT REPEAT AS DESIRED.
TOON

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01-Jan-1994 12:00:00 am
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: HUMAN RIGHTS, DIPLOMATIC DISCUSSIONS, SALT (ARMS CONTROL)
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Sent Date: 18-Mar-1977 12:00:00 am
Decaption Date: 22 May 2009
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1977MOSCOW03633
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: X1
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D770093-0820
Format: TEL
From: MOSCOW
Handling Restrictions:
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1977/newtext/t19770346/aaaabnjq.tel
Line Count: 293
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: f805eeb5-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION SS
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 6
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: n/a
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 16-Mar-2005 12:00:00 am
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 3067317
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: AMBASSADOR'S CONVERSATION WITH ARBATOV ON SALT AND HUMAN RIGHTS
TAGS: PFOR, SHUM, PARM, UR, US
To: STATE
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odb://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/f805eeb5-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
22 May 2009
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009